EK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 8:11 PM

Notes
CONSPIRACY AND THE FANTASY DEFENSE:
THE STRANGE CASE OF THE CANNIBAL COP
KAITLIN EK†
ABSTRACT
In the notorious “Cannibal Cop” case, New York police officer
Gilberto Valle was accused of conspiring to kidnap, kill, and eat
various women of his acquaintance. Valle claimed a “fantasy
defense,” arguing that his expression represented not conspiracy
agreement, but fantasy role-play. His conviction and subsequent
acquittal raised questions about the freedom of speech, thoughtcrime,
and the nature of conspiracy law. Because the essence of conspiracy is
agreement, it falls into the category of crimes in which pure speech is
the actus reus of the offense. This Note argues that as a result,
conspiracy cases in which the fantasy defense is implicated pose
special due-process and First Amendment dangers, and concludes
that these dangers can be mitigated by a strengthened overt-act
requirement.

INTRODUCTION
“Gil Valle’s fantasy is about seeing women executed. The fantasies
that he is engaging in are about seeing women sexually assaulted,
executed and left for dead. That’s not a fantasy that is OK.”
– Randall W. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, in closing
1
argument.

The headlines sound like something out of a schlocky slasher
2
flick: “‘Cannibal’ Cop Plotted to Eat 100 Women: Feds,” “NYPD
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1. Transcript of Record at 1581, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
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Stew as Cannibal Cop Plots To Cook and Eat Women,” “‘Cannibal
4
Cop’ Planned To Cook ‘Girl-Meat’ for Thanksgiving.” In late 2012,
federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York charged the
so-called “Cannibal Cop,” twenty-eight-year-old New York police
5
officer Gilberto Valle, with conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He
was arrested after his wife discovered an extensive log of emails and
chats in which Valle discussed in graphic detail his desire to kidnap,
rape, kill, and eat a number of women, including his wife, friends and
6
acquaintances.
But although the emails and chats were real, Valle argued that
the alleged conspiracy was not—rather, he contended that he was
merely engaging in fantasy role-play, with no intention of carrying out
7
the gruesome deeds he discussed online. He was a member of Dark
Fetish Net, a social-networking website where users with unusual
sexual predilections tell stories, role-play, and discuss sexual fantasies
8
considered unacceptable in mainstream culture. He argued at trial, as
he wrote in his online profile, “I like to press the envelope, but no
9
matter what I say, it is all fantasy.”
But although prosecutors conceded that Valle was heavily
involved in fantasy role-play, they maintained that some of the chats
had moved beyond the realm of fantasy to become actual preparation

2. Richard Esposito, ‘Cannibal’ Cop Plotted To Eat 100 Women: Feds, ABC NEWS (Oct.
25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cannibal-cop-plotted-eat-100-women-feds/story?id=
17562584.
3. Josh Margolin, NYPD Stew as Cannibal Cop Plots To Cook and Eat Women: Feds,
N.Y. POST, Oct. 26, 2012, at 8, available at http://nypost.com/2012/10/26/nypd-stew-as-cannibalcop-plots-to-cook-and-eat-women-feds.
4. Jen Chung, “Cannibal Cop” Planned To Cook “Girl Meat” for Thanksgiving,
GOTHAMIST (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://gothamist.com/2012/11/21/cannibal_cop_planned_
to_cook_girl_m.php.
5. Complaint at 1, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/25/nyregion/Valle-Gilberto-CriminalComplaint.html.
6. Transcript of Record at 422, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
2013).
7. See Transcript of Record at 130, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2013).
8. Transcript of Record at 1547–48, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013).
9. Transcript of Record at 1409, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2013).
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and agreement to gratify aberrant desires. The prosecution
dismissed Valle’s fantasy defense, branding as ridiculous “this idea
that you should somehow not be disturbed by the fact that this man, a
police officer, walking around New York City every single day with a
loaded weapon has a . . . primary sexual fantasy of seeing women
11
mutilated and harmed in horrific ways.”
12
After twelve days of trial, the jury found Gilberto Valle guilty.
13
However, in a “stunning reversal” in June 2014, Judge Paul G.
Gardephe granted the defense’s motion for acquittal on the
conspiracy charge, and Gilberto Valle walked free after more than a
14
year of incarceration.
Valle’s case garnered widespread media coverage, most of it
focused on the grim details of the chats, emails, images, and videos
15
found on Valle’s computer. The case even inspired an episode of
16
Law and Order: Special Victims Unit. However, a small but vocal
minority of commentators criticized the jury verdict as a thoughtcrime
17
conviction that punished Valle for his fantasies rather than his acts.
As one columnist argued, “It’s time to defend the ‘cannibal cop’: He’s
a weirdo, not a monster, and the U.S. attorney’s office means to roast
him on the spit of prudery and overcaution. Gilberto Valle’s fantasies

10. See Transcript of Record at 1586, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013) (“The reason is, he realizes that what he is doing is part of a plan that goes far
beyond fantasy.”).
11. Id. at 1578.
12. See Transcript of Record at 1695, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 12, 2013).
13. Daniel Beekman & Dareh Gregorian, ‘Cannibal Cop’ Released into Custody of His
Mother After Conviction Overturned in Stunning Reversal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 1, 2014, 7:03
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/conviction-cannibal-nypd-overturnedarticle-1.1850334#ixzz3BswPYruK.
14. Benjamin Weiser, Ruling in Cannibal Case Revives Debate over When a Fantasy
Crosses a Criminal Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014, at A20, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/nyregion/officer-gilberto-valle-freed-after-conviction-overturnedin-cannibal-case.html.
15. See, e.g., Margolin, supra note 3.
16. Law and Order: Special Victims Unit: Thought Criminal (NBC television broadcast
May 14, 2014). For a comparison of the episode and Valle’s case, see Allison Leotta, SVU’s
“Thought
Criminal”,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(May
15,
2014,
5:47
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allison-leotta/svus-thought-criminal_b_5327940.html.
17. See, e.g., Fantasy Is Not a Crime, FREE GIL VALLE.NET, http://freegilvalle.net (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015); Daniel Jennings, Can the Government Use Your Thoughts Against You?,
OFF THE GRID NEWS (June 17, 2013), http://www.offthegridnews.com/2013/06/17/cangovernment-use-your-thoughts-against-you.
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are sick. His real-life prosecution may be even sicker.” Valle’s
conviction and subsequent acquittal engendered a spirited debate
encompassing fantasy, the First Amendment, sex, public safety, and
the role of the judge and jury in negotiating the boundary lines
19
between them.
This Note examines how the freedom to have and express
fantasies interacts with the law of criminal conspiracy in cases like
Valle’s. Although Valle’s case was perhaps singularly gruesome, it is
one of a growing swell of cases in which criminal defendants claim a
20
“fantasy defense.” Using Valle’s trial as an exemplar of the fantasy
defense in practice, this Note argues that conspiracy law, as it stands
today, is too formless and flexible to adequately safeguard against the
risk that a jury will convict a defendant for expressing his fantasies
rather than acting on them. This Note proposes that, contrary to the
21
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Shabani, not only does
the Constitution require that conspiracy include an overt-act element;
it requires a more rigorous overt-act element than the version
currently accepted in statutory or common law.
Part I describes the Gilberto Valle case and other fantasydefense cases. Part II sketches the contours of the right to express
fantasies under the First Amendment. Part III examines the
implications of the actus reus requirement of criminal law for the
fantasy defense. Part IV explores the theoretical underpinnings of
conspiracy law, and explains how current conspiracy law allows for
guilty verdicts on the basis of both improper reasoning and
insufficient evidence. Finally, Part V proposes that conspiracy’s overtact requirement should be strengthened to avoid wrongful convictions
and infringement on the right to expression.

18. Daniel Engber, Free the Cannibal Cop, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 2:40 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2013/02/cannibal_cop_trial_gilberto_valle
_faces_life_in_prison_for_his_violent_fantasies.html.
19. See, e.g., Tracy Clark-Flory, The “Cannibal Cop” Debate, SALON (Mar. 12, 2013, 8:00
PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/13/the_cannibal_cop_debate; Weiser, supra note 14;
Walking the Line Between Off-Putting and Illegal, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/05/in-free-speech-a-line-between-offputtingand-illegal.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
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I. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. GILBERTO VALLE
The United States charged Gilberto Valle with conspiracy to
22
23
commit kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. For the jury to find
Valle guilty, the government was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Valle intentionally entered into an agreement
to commit kidnapping, that he intended that the kidnapping actually
occur, and that he or one of his co-conspirators committed an overt
24
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The use of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce—the Internet—supplied the nexus required for
25
federal prosecution. This Section describes the progression of the
trial and Valle’s subsequent acquittal. It also briefly summarizes
several other cases illustrating some circumstances in which
defendants may raise fantasy defenses.
A. The Prosecution’s Case
1. Valle’s Online Communications. The first prong of the
prosecution’s case was evidence about the content and nature of
26
Valle’s online chats with other users of Dark Fetish Net. Specifically,
the government alleged that Valle’s co-conspirators included a New
Jersey man named Michael Van Hise, a Pakistani man named Ali

22. The government also charged Valle with unauthorized access of a police database
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B) (2012). Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. This Note will not discuss
that charge except to the extent that the government offered Valle’s access of the police
database as evidence of conspiracy.
23. Valle was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), which provides: “If two or more persons
conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012). The government specifically alleged that Valle conspired to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), which reads:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries
away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . [when] the offender
travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of
the commission of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012).
24. Transcript of Record at 1651, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
25. Id. at 1654.
26. See Transcript of Record at 121, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2013) (outlining the prosecution’s evidence to be offered).
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Khan, and a user known as Moody Blues (discovered during trial to
28
be an English nurse named Dale Bollinger).
The prosecution introduced the chats through the testimony of
29
FBI agent Corey Walsh. Walsh testified that of the thousands of
chats and emails recovered from Valle’s computer, the FBI concluded
that about forty represented actual conspiracy discussions, and that
30
the remainder were mere fantasy. Walsh concluded that a chat was
part of a mere fantasy when the participants used the word “fantasy”
and that a chat was part of a real conspiracy when participants did not
use the word “fantasy” and “the two people were sharing real details
of women, names, what appeared to be photographs of the women,
31
details of past crimes and [saying] that they were for real.”
The prosecution asked Agent Walsh to read aloud from the
32
transcripts of the chats that he determined were real. The plans were
violent and detailed—in the excerpts read in court, Valle painted
himself as an aspiring professional kidnapper, willing to negotiate
prices for contract deals, or to collaborate on plans to rape, kill, and
33
34
eat targets. He outlined how he would kidnap the women, shared
35
photographs of potential targets, and engaged in seemingly endless
36
back-and-forth about cooking techniques. In a typical exchange,
Valle, using the handle Mhal52, discussed his plan for cooking his
friend Andria with Ali Khan:
Mhal52: “Yeah, I really want her to be alive in the oven. I want her
to experience being cooked alive.”

27. Id.
28. Robert Gearty, Ginger Adams Otis & Dareh Gregorian, ‘Moody Blues,’ Alleged
Twisted Online Chat Buddy of Accused ‘Cannibal Cop’ Gilberto Valle, Arrested in U.K. on Child
Porn Rap, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
cannibal-buddy-moody-blues-booked-u-child-porn-charges-article-1.1276679#ixzz2ptrMxS8i.
29. Transcript of Record at 426, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
2013).
30. Transcript of Record at 650–51, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
27, 2013).
31. Transcript of Record at 425, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
2013).
32. Id. at 432–33.
33. Id. at 425.
34. Id. at 441.
35. Id. at 443.
36. Transcript of Record at 635, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,
2013).
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Alisherkhan: “Tie her in a hogtied position and put her in oven. She
will be a cool meat.”
Mhal52: “No. She’ll be trussed up like a turkey laying on her back,
her hands tied in front of her, her feet crossed at the ankles and tied
37
up, then the hands and feet connected, tied with cooking twine.”

The defense acknowledged the horrific nature of the
communications, but argued that the forty chats Walsh read from at
trial were as fantastical as the thousands the FBI dismissed as role38
play. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Walsh’s
methodology for distinguishing between the real and fantasy chats,
pointing out that the mere fact that a chat does not explicitly identify
itself as fantasy does not mean that it is part of a real conspiracy
39
plot. The defense argued that many elements of the “real” chats
were also present in the fantasy chats, such as negotiating a price for
40
kidnapping a victim or discussing the use of chloroform.
Additionally, the defense pointed to Valle’s user profile on Dark
Fetish Net, on which he wrote, “I like to press the envelope, but no
41
matter what I say, it is all fantasy.”
Furthermore, the defense contended that though the “real” chats
contained references to actual women, Valle often falsified their last
names and parts of their biographical information, as well as his own
42
identity. And although the plots were meticulous in their detail, they
were also patently preposterous. For instance, in one chat the FBI
considered “real,” Valle said he would kidnap a woman; take her in
his van to his mountain cabin; torture her using a pulley apparatus in
his soundproofed basement; and, finally, cook her in his giant,
43
human-sized oven. However, Valle had no van, no mountain cabin,
37. Id.
38. Transcript of Record at 1547, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013). In one chat the FBI deemed a fantasy, Valle told his chat partner “Jackcrow Two” that
he would kidnap Andria, the same woman he promised to Aly Khan, by “stick[ing] [Andria] in
the oven while she is still alive [but] at a relatively low heat.” United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D.
53, 71 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (second alteration in original).
39. Transcript of Record at 655–56, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
27, 2013).
40. Transcript of Record at 1552, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
41. Transcript of Record at 1409, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2013).
42. Transcript of Record at 1553, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
43. Id. at 1556.
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no basement or pulley apparatus, and no giant oven. And although
Valle’s alleged co-conspirators purported to live in other countries,
including Pakistan and the United Kingdom, they bought no plane
tickets and made no hotel reservations for the dates of the alleged
45
plots.
Additionally, the defense argued, Valle and his chat partners
regularly set dates for each kidnapping attempt, and each date passed
46
by with no further contact or communication about the attempt.
Never did one of Valle’s co-conspirators complain that he had failed
47
to deliver a target as promised. Instead, the co-conspirators would
pick up chatting about a new target and a new plan as if the previous
48
plan had never existed.
Finally, the defense attempted to demonstrate to the jury that
Valle’s chats were not as singularly aberrational as they might seem.
To help demystify Dark Fetish Net, where Valle met his alleged coconspirators, the defense played a video deposition of Sergey
Merenkov, the website’s founder, who testified that he created the
49
site for fantasy, and that it had tens of thousands of members.
Additionally, defense counsel called as a witness their paralegal, who
took the jury on a video tour of Dark Fetish Net to demonstrate that
50
other users were engaging in activity similar to Valle’s.
2. Valle’s Off-line Activities.
The second prong of the
prosecution’s case was evidence of Valle’s off-line activities, which,
according to the prosecution, both satisfied the overt-act requirement
of the conspiracy charge and proved that Valle intended that the
51
kidnappings occur. These acts included giving Police Benevolent
52
Association (PBA) cards to his alleged targets, searching for them in

44. Id.
45. Id. at 1554–55.
46. Id. at 1552–53.
47. Id. at 1553.
48. Id.
49. Transcript of Record at 1357, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2013).
50. Id. at 1393.
51. Transcript of Record at 1526, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
52. PBA cards are union-membership cards that police officers give to friends. If the friend
is stopped for a traffic violation, she can show the card in hopes of lenient treatment from the
officer. Transcript of Record at 1424–25, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 2013).
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the police database, and surveilling them under the guise of
53
friendship. The alleged surveillance activities involved meeting one
54
55
woman for brunch, visiting another woman at work, and
56
occasionally texting or messaging various women.
The defense countered that these off-line actions were innocuous
social gestures, just as consistent with innocent conduct as with
57
conspiracy. For example, the defense elicited testimony that when
meeting one of his alleged targets for brunch, Valle brought along his
58
wife and infant daughter. The defense also called as a witness a
police officer who testified about the common use of PBA cards to
rebut the government’s implication that Valle was behaving
59
suspiciously by giving PBA cards to his alleged targets.
Finally, along with those two lines of evidence, the prosecution
presented the jury with a litany of pornographic images and videos
60
Valle had viewed or saved to his computer, as well as his search
histories (most notably, his visit to a website with the rather on-the61
nose title “howtomakechloroform.net”). These, the prosecution
claimed, demonstrated Valle’s motivation for entering into the
62
conspiracy, and bolstered the seriousness of his chats. The defense
disputed this characterization, saying that Valle’s Internet history was
63
equally consistent with a sick, but fantastical, fetish.

53. Transcript of Record at 1528–30, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013).
54. Id. at 1526.
55. Id. at 1541.
56. Id. at 1528, 1530.
57. Id. at 1570.
58. Id. at 1566–67.
59. Transcript of Record at 1426, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2013).
60. E.g., Transcript of Record at 1094, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 2013) (describing an image found on Valle’s computer of a naked woman suspended
upside-down).
61. Transcript of Record at 639, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,
2013).
62. Transcript of Record at 1596, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2013).
63. Id. at 1568.
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B. The Conviction and Acquittal
Ultimately, after sixteen hours of deliberation, the jury convicted
64
Gilberto Valle of conspiracy to commit kidnapping. However, in a
surprising turn of events, Judge Gardephe granted a judgment of
acquittal just over a year later, in June 2014, on the basis of
65
insufficient evidence. He wrote in his opinion, “Despite the highly
disturbing nature of Valle’s deviant and depraved sexual interests, his
chats and emails about these interests are not sufficient—standing
alone—to make out the elements of conspiracy to commit
kidnapping. There must be evidence that Valle intended to act on
66
these interests with an alleged co-conspirator.”
The court echoed the defense’s doubts about the government’s
characterization of the chats and emails as “real” instead of as
fantasy, pointing out that the facts on which the government
distinguished the two—such as negotiation over price or discussion of
67
fear of getting caught—were present in both types of chats.
Furthermore, the court noted that several facts seemed to
affirmatively suggest the chats were fantasy role-play, such as Valle’s
lies to his alleged co-conspirators about his own identity as well as the
68
identities of the alleged targets.
Finally, the court addressed the “unique circumstances” of a
conspiracy “alleged to have taken place almost exclusively in
cyberspace, and in a context in which . . . the Defendant engaged in
69
countless fantasy role-play conversations.” The court wrote, “[I]n
determining whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable
doubt Valle’s criminal intent—his specific intent to actually kidnap a
woman—the fact that no kidnappings took place and that no realworld, concrete steps toward committing a kidnapping were ever
70
undertaken, is significant.”
After exhaustively cataloging and analyzing the evidence, the
court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found that the

64. Benjamin Weiser, ‘Ugly Thoughts’ Defense Fails; Officer Guilty in Cannibal Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at A1.
65. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
66. Id. at 61–62.
67. Id. at 84–86.
68. See, e.g., id. at 98 (describing the false information Valle provided to then-anonymous
user Moody Blues about himself and alleged target Kimberly Sauer).
69. Id. at 61.
70. Id.
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government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle entered
into genuine agreements, or had specific intent, to kidnap the women
71
72
featured in his chats. The government has appealed this decision.
C. Other Fantasy-Defense Cases
Gilberto Valle is not the only criminal defendant to raise the so73
called “fantasy defense.” The advent of the Internet has led to a
number of cases in which defendants claimed that their online
conduct merely expressed personal fantasies, and did not constitute
criminal behavior. To begin with, the FBI’s investigation led not only
to Valle’s arrest, but also to the arrest of one of his alleged coconspirators, Michael Van Hise, as well as two other individuals who
74
75
engaged in similar communications. One man has pled guilty, and
the other two were convicted by jury and are awaiting the judge’s
76
rulings on their motions for acquittal.
The fantasy defense has also arisen in the prosecutions of other
77
inchoate sex-related crimes. Perhaps the most notorious example is
the case of well-known software developer Patrick Naughton.
Naughton allegedly flew from Seattle to Los Angeles to meet his
online chat correspondent, who described herself to Naughton as a
78
thirteen-year-old girl, for sex. In fact, the “girl” was an FBI agent,
and Naughton was charged with traveling in interstate commerce with

71. Id. at 102.
72. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014).
73. Chris Francescani, ‘Cannibal Cop’ Co-Defendants To Offer Same Fantasy Defense,
REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-crimecannibal-idUSBREA1N0UH20140224.
74. Daniel Engber, The Cannibal Cop Goes Free, but What About the Murderous
Mechanic?, SLATE (July 2, 2014, 7:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
crime/2014/07/the_cannibal_cop_gilberto_valle_goes_free_what_about_michael_van_hise_and
.html.
75. Id.
76. See Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at 5, United States v. Van Hise, No. 12-cr-00847
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2014) (requesting a judgment of acquittal for defendants Michael Van Hise
and Robert Christopher Asch).
77. Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown in a
Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549 (2001); see
also United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (dismissing an indictment for
communicating threats because the emails the defendant sent to another person—violent,
sexual stories featuring a classmate as a character—took place in a mutual exchange of fantasy
stories, and so defendant did not send them with intent to intimidate).
78. Greg Miller, In Sentencing Deal, No Jail Time for Ex-Online Exec in Sex Case, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/10/business/fi-2015.
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the intent to have sex with a minor. Naughton claimed that he had
always believed his correspondent to be an adult who was merely
80
role-playing as a child. The jury hung, and Naughton eventually pled
81
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.
Analogous defenses have also emerged in cases that have little or
82
no relation to sexual expression. In United States v. Myers, for
instance, the defendant sought—unsuccessfully—to have his
conviction for bribery overturned by arguing that his agreement to
83
receive a bribe was mere “playacting.” Similarly, the Supreme Court
84
has recently granted certiorari in Elonis v. United States, a case that
presents issues comparable to those inherent in the fantasy defense.
Anthony Douglas Elonis was convicted of transmitting threats in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), partly on the basis of rap “lyrics” he
posted on Facebook in which he wrote about killing his estranged
85
wife. Elonis argued on appeal that the First Amendment requires
the government to prove he subjectively intended to make a threat,
not just that a reasonable person would understand it as such, and
86
that therefore his “lyrics” were protected speech. The Third Circuit
87
disagreed, and upheld his conviction.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EXPRESSION AND FANTASY
Before it can be established that conspiracy law risks violating
the First Amendment right to expression in cases like Valle’s, the
precise contours of the right itself must be delineated. Under the First
Amendment, unpopular or offensive expression cannot be restricted
88
merely because the government disagrees with it, even if the speech
89
in question advocates conduct proscribed by law. The Supreme
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 831.
84. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June
16, 2014) (No. 13–983), argued, Dec. 1, 2014.
85. Id. at 324–26, 327.
86. Id. at 327–28.
87. Id. at 335.
88. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (“[W]e have consistently
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its
suppression.”).
89. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689–90
(1959). There is a narrow, historical exception for speech that “is directed to inciting or
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Court has held that the government may not restrict expression on
90
the basis of its content unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to
91
serve a compelling government interest. Application of this strict
92
scrutiny “leaves few survivors.” For example, the government may
93
not prohibit burning the American flag, showing a film that portrays
94
95
adultery in a positive light, or posting racist symbols.
Like all rights, however, First Amendment rights are not
unlimited in scope. Falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is the
96
archetypal example of speech that deserves no constitutional shield.
Though all speech is presumptively protected, there are two major
lines of limitations on First Amendment rights. First, content-neutral
regulations, which regulate speech for reasons other than its
97
expressive impact, are subject to a relaxed standard of review. For
example, the state may constitutionally prohibit playing music above
a certain decibel threshold because the prohibition’s target is the
98
volume of the music, not its expression. Second, even content-based
restrictions of speech may escape strict scrutiny if they fall into
99
historically recognized categories of exceptions. The fantasy defense
to criminal conspiracy implicates two possible historical exceptions:
the exception for obscenity and the exception for speech that is itself
defined as criminal conduct.

producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
90. To determine whether a regulation is based on the content of the regulated speech, the
Court asks “whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).
91. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
92. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
93. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990).
94. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp., 360 U.S. at 689.
95. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
96. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (originating the famous analogy).
97. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
98. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1286 (2005) (explaining that a law barring noise louder than ninety decibels is “content-neutral
as applied”); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (noting that “[f]ighting words are thus analogous to
a noisy sound truck”).
99. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). For a list of all currently
acknowledged First Amendment exceptions, see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012).
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A. The Obscenity Exception
Under the obscenity exception, transmission, dissemination, and
receipt of obscene materials receive no First Amendment
100
protection. Although the Supreme Court has never held obscenity
to be within the reach of the First Amendment, the Court has long
101
102
struggled to define obscenity. In the “tortured history” of the
exception, the Supreme Court has adopted and subsequently
103
abandoned a number of methods for defining obscenity.
104
Under current doctrine, established by Miller v. California,
obscene materials are those which “depict or describe sexual
conduct,” and “which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
105
artistic, political, or scientific value.” The Court further explained
that only “‘hard core’ pornography,” not any depiction of sex, can
106
qualify as “obscene” under this test. Thus, a state may prohibit
distributing, for instance, only “[p]atently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
107
of the genitals.” And even hard-core pornography will not qualify as
obscene unless “‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
108
appeals to the prurient interest,” meaning that it appeals to
109
“shameful or morbid interest in sex,” and not merely “normal,
110
healthy sexual desires.”
The nature of the Miller test renders obscenity prosecutions on
111
the basis of textual material exceedingly rare. In Kaplan v.

100. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming that the First Amendment
does not protect obscene material).
101. See id. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (detailing the Court’s different attempts to
define obscenity).
102. Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
105. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
109. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
110. Id. at 498.
111. Ryen Rasmus, Note, The Auto-Authentication of the Page: Purely Written Speech and
the Doctrine of Obscenity, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 253, 254 (2011).
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California, a companion case to Miller, the Court held that purely
textual material was not categorically barred from qualifying as
113
obscene under the Miller test. However, after Kaplan was handed
down in 1973, thirty-five years passed before federal prosecutors
114
successfully pursued an obscenity case for purely textual material.
In that case, the defendant, who had agoraphobia, pled guilty to avoid
115
the stress of trial, and it is unclear whether the prosecution would
have withstood a First Amendment challenge.
The obscenity exception is further narrowed by a distinction
between private and public obscenity. Though the government may
prohibit disseminating or receiving obscene materials, it may not
116
prohibit merely possessing or consuming them in private. In Stanley
117
v. Georgia, the Court held such a prohibition impermissible because
it relied on the “assertion that the State has the right to control the
118
moral content of a person’s thoughts.” The Court further stated, “If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
119
may read or what films he may watch.”
In other words, private consumption and expression are not
subject to the obscenity exception because there may exist some right
to thought itself in the First Amendment. Extrapolating from this
principle, lower courts have reasoned that the First Amendment
120
protects the right to privately generate ideas as well. For example,
the Tenth Circuit ruled on this basis that the forcible administration
of antipsychotic drugs to a detainee in jail could have

112. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
113. Id. at 119–20.
114. Neil A. Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2007, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html.
115. Paula Reed Ward, Afraid of Public Trial, Author To Plead Guilty in Online Obscenity
Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.postgazette.com/frontpage/2008/05/17/Afraid-of-public-trial-author-to-plead-guilty-in-onlineobscenity-case/stories/200805170216.
116. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
117. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557.
118. Id. at 565.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393–94 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The First
Amendment protects the communication of ideas, which itself implies protection of the capacity
to produce ideas.”).
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unconstitutionally violated his First Amendment rights by interfering
121
with his ability to think as he wished.
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question
of whether private, noncommercial emails containing obscene textual
descriptions fall within Stanley’s protection. However, the Court has
122
upheld prohibitions on importing obscene materials for private use,
123
and on distributing obscene material through the mail. The Fourth
Circuit is the only federal appellate court so far to apply this line of
precedent to the email context. In a highly controversial opinion, it
held that obscene emails are no different from any other obscene
material transported through the stream of interstate commerce, and
124
thus deserve no Stanley protection.
Therefore, under the obscenity exception, a state is likely within
its rights to regulate the distribution of the gruesome pornography
spotlighted in cases like Gilberto Valle’s. Assuming the government
125
could have satisfied the Miller test, it could have legitimately
prohibited Valle from purchasing pornography or from sharing his
pornography with others on Dark Fetish Net. However, the First
Amendment does protect Gilberto Valle’s personal use of
pornographic materials. Additionally, the textual content of Valle’s
chats and emails—which was necessary to, and formed the bulk of the
evidence in, his conspiracy prosecution—also probably falls outside
the obscenity exception. Textual material, as a general principle, is
126
unlikely to qualify as obscene under Miller, and Valle’s chats
contain relatively little in the way of hard-core descriptions of sexual
conduct. Thus, unless another exception applies, Valle’s chats likely
qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment.

121. Id. at 1395.
122. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973).
123. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
124. United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2008). For an example of
criticism and discussion of this decision, see Christopher Shea, Obscenity Law: Still a
Hodgepodge?, BRAINIAC (July 9, 2009), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/
2009/07/obscenity_law_s.html; Eugene Volokh, Obscenity Conviction for Adult-to-Adult
Noncommercial E-mail About (Fantasy) Sex with Children, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16,
2009), http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_06_14-2009_06_20.shtml#1245192215.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 104–15.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 111–15.
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B. Speech That Doubles as Criminal Conduct
Of course, some would argue that evaluating Gilberto Valle’s
case under the obscenity exception misses the point: although the
heinous nature of his fantasies was naturally a focus at trial, he was
charged with criminal conspiracy, not mere possession or
transmission of pornography. Thus, this Note turns now to the second
strain of First Amendment reasoning implicated by the fantasy
defense: expression that is itself the prohibited actus reus of a
criminal offense, or—put another way—speech that doubles as
criminal conduct.
Although the First Amendment protects speech that advocates
127
criminal conduct as well as speech that could lead to criminal
128
conduct, it offers no protection for actual criminal conduct merely
129
because it involves thought or expression. As the Supreme Court
has noted, “The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the
reach of government, but government regulation of drug sales is not
130
prohibited by the Constitution.” Conspiracy poses an interesting
problem in this framework because the actus reus of the crime—
agreement—is pure expression.
Throughout history, both practitioners and scholars have
assumed that the First Amendment has little to say about conspiracy
131
and similar crimes. In 1949, the Supreme Court decisively stated in
132
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. that the First Amendment
offers no protection for speech “used as an integral part of conduct in
133
violation of a valid criminal statute,” but apparently felt no need to

127. Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689–90
(1959). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (delineating an exception for
speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action”).
128. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (“Given the present state of
knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground
that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.”).
129. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973); see United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (holding that requests to obtain child pornography are not protected by
the First Amendment because “[m]any long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws
against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech . . . that is intended to
induce or commence illegal activities”).
130. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 67–68.
131. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1284.
132. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
133. Id. at 498.
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explain what qualifies as “integral,” or to offer any reasoning behind
134
this seeming tautology. Since then, most case law examining the
intersection between conspiracy and the First Amendment has
focused on situations in which the goal of the conspiracy involves
135
protected speech. However, the fantasy defense raises the question
of whether the alleged conspiracy agreement itself can ever be
protected. Although speech that doubles as criminal conduct—such
as in conspiracy, perjury, and aiding-and-abetting offenses—
presumably fits within the broader Giboney exception of speech
136
integral to criminal conduct, the Supreme Court has only recently
begun to attempt to explain why speech that doubles as criminal
137
conduct is excluded from First Amendment protection.
1. The Speech-As-Conduct Rationale. In previous years, most
scholars believed that expression in these types of crimes was exempt
from protection because it fell within the “speech as conduct” rule the
138
Court applied in other circumstances.
This rule distinguishes
between speech restricted for its expressive content and speech
139
restricted for its non-expressive aspects. In this view, for instance,
punishing a defendant for perjury is analogous to punishing a
defendant for playing his music too loudly; what is being punished is
not the content of the lie itself, but the conduct of lying. In his 1989
134. See Volokh, supra note 98, at 1314 (“[N]one of the obvious interpretations of
Giboney’s rather ambiguous language makes much sense.”).
135. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360–63 (2003) (addressing whether conspiracy
to unlawfully burn crosses passes First Amendment muster); United States v. Mehanna, 735
F.3d 32, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (deciding that a conviction for conspiracy to provide material support
to a terrorist organization is constitutional under the First Amendment even when the material
support at hand was the translation of jihadist texts).
136. Although speech that doubles as crime likely fits within the “speech integral to criminal
conduct” exception, that exception is broader. For instance, this category also includes nonobscene child pornography, possession of which the Court has ruled is unprotected based not on
its content, but on its status as the product of sexual abuse. United States v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 762–63 (1982); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002)
(explaining that the First Amendment applies to artificially generated, non-obscene child
pornography because in Ferber, “[t]he production of the work, not its content, was the target of
the statute”). Because the precise outline of the speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct category is
unclear, and because it seems to encompass more than just speech that doubles as criminal
conduct, this Note limits its discussion to the narrower category.
137. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (explaining that offers to give or
receive unlawful items have no social value, and therefore, like “conspiracy and solicitation,”
are not protected by the First Amendment).
138. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1282–83.
139. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (explaining that
“[f]ighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck”).
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survey of First Amendment law, Professor Kent Greenawalt posited
that conspiracy agreement fits into this doctrine because it is a
“situation-altering utterance”—speech that alters the expectations
and felt obligations of the listener—rendering agreement more like
140
an act than like expression. Thus, in Greenawalt’s view, conspiracy
is not a true exception to the First Amendment’s protections, but is
simply not expression.
In more recent years, scholars such as Professor Eugene Volokh
have criticized what they view as a false distinction between conduct
141
and speech inherent in Greenawalt’s argument. For instance,
Volokh argues that giving a speech advocating a boycott might create
a feeling of moral obligation in the listeners to do as the speaker says
142
because of the persuasive nature of his speech. However, such a
speech, far from being exempted as “conduct” from First
Amendment protection, is a classic example of political expression,
143
unquestionably falling within the First Amendment’s ambit. Thus,
Volokh argues, speech that doubles as criminal conduct must be
144
understood as a true exception to the First Amendment.
2. The Battle of the True-Exception Rationales. This scholarly
debate was resolved, however temporarily, in 2008 by United States v.
145
Williams,
in which the defendant argued that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(3)(B), a statute criminalizing offers to provide and
requests to obtain child pornography, was facially invalid under the
First Amendment because it prohibited a “substantial amount of

140. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–58 (1989).
141. See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 107, 114 (1982) (“It is futile to argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any
or all of these utterances does not abridge speech. It does, it is meant to, and one should not
take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is ‘speech-brigaded with-action’ or ‘conduct’
alone that is curtailed by laws reaching these cases.”); Volokh, supra note 98, at 1330–31 (“But
why should a statement’s creating a felt moral obligation turn that statement from
presumptively constitutionally protected speech into unprotected conduct? After all, there are
many social conventions under which the making of a statement will be seen by some as
increasing the speaker’s moral obligations, or increasing or decreasing the listener’s moral
obligations.”); see also Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 865, 910–11 (2013) (proposing a reformulation of Greenawalt’s structure that
distinguishes between “operational” and “aspirational” speech).
142. Volokh, supra note 98, at 1331–32.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1337–38.
145. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
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protected speech.” Citing Giboney, the Supreme Court explicitly
held—for the first time—that the crime of solicitation garnered no
First Amendment protection. Rather than distinguish between speech
and speech-as-conduct to take solicitation outside of First
Amendment protection, the Court seemed to recognize solicitation as
a true exception, premised “on the principle that offers to give or
receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value and thus,
147
like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection.”
This justification echoed the Court’s analysis in many other First
148
Amendment−exception cases. For instance, in the seminal case
149
United States v. Roth, the Court justified the obscenity exception on
the basis of its estimation that obscenity is “utterly without redeeming
150
social importance.” Other First Amendment contexts in which the
Court has used this line of reasoning include child pornography that
151
152
does not rise to Miller’s obscenity standard, fighting words, and
153
defamation. Furthermore, the Williams Court implied that its
reasoning applied not only to solicitation, but also to the expression
inherent in conspiracy and incitement, because they are all
“speech . . . that is intended to induce or commence illegal
154
activities.”
However, the Court deemphasized the lack-of-social-value
155
rationale a mere two years later in United States v. Stevens. In
Stevens, the government argued that First Amendment jurisprudence,
including Roth and Williams, established a test under which the First
Amendment extends only to expression that meets a minimum
146. Id. at 292.
147. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding an exception
to First Amendment protection for expression deemed “obscene . . . profane . . . or libelous”).
149. United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
150. Id. at 484.
151. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1982) (“The value of permitting live
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”).
152. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (“It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.”).
153. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
571–72) (finding that epithets, personal abuse, or “fighting words” do not constitute
communication for First Amendment purposes).
154. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008).
155. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
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156

threshold of social value. Under this test, the government argued, a
statute outlawing “crush videos,” films of animal killing or cruelty,
was valid under the First Amendment because such videos have a de
minimis social value that is outweighed by society’s interest in
157
morality and order.
The Court flatly rejected “permit[ting] the Government to
imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts
158
in a statute’s favor.” Rather, the Court held that solicitation,
obscenity, and other excepted forms of speech escape First
Amendment protection not because of “cost-benefit analysis” but
because they belong to “historic and traditional categories [of
159
exceptions] long familiar to the bar.” Because not all crush videos
prohibited by the statute fell within one of these categories, the
160
statute was unconstitutional.
In many ways, the decision in Stevens was protective of First
Amendment rights. By refusing to expand exceptions to First
Amendment protections to the kind of almost-but-not-quite
obscenity at hand in Stevens, the Court affirmed that legislative
determinations of social value could not control the constitutionality
of government restriction of expressive speech. However, by
retracting the lack-of-social-value rationale for obscenity and speech
that doubles as criminal conduct, the Stevens Court suggested that a
long pedigree is the sole and sufficient justification for their exclusion
from First Amendment protection. For obscenity cases, this holding
has little practical effect: the guiding principles of the exception,
including social-value determinations, are already baked in the cake
of the Miller test. However, for speech that doubles as criminal
conduct, the absence of a principled rationale renders it difficult to
precisely delineate the scope of the exception.
First, it cannot be seriously suggested that actual conspiracy and
solicitation should categorically gain First Amendment protection;
such a shift would put an end to criminal convictions that are both

156. Reply Brief for the United States at 11–12, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL
2564714.
157. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–70.
158. Id. at 471.
159. Id. at 468.
160. Id. at 474–75.
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legitimate and necessary for public safety. On the other hand, it
seems problematic to claim that First Amendment considerations can
never have a place in these prosecutions, particularly in the fantasydefense context. After all, if a defendant is convicted of conspiracy
when his “conspiracy” agreement was, in fact, fantasy, his wrongful
conviction not only punishes him for a crime he did not commit, but
also punishes his entirely protected speech—an impermissible result
162
under the First Amendment.
C. Evidence Law in the Shadow of the First Amendment
Although Stevens has made it clear that conspiracy agreement is
not categorically protected by the First Amendment, even speech that
allegedly doubles as criminal conduct might require First Amendment
protection in some circumstances. After all, a criminal prosecution
can run a serious risk of punishing a defendant for the unpopularity of
his expression, rather than for his actual guilt. In these types of cases,
the courts have demonstrated some willingness to adopt heightened
evidentiary standards, sometimes by institution of doctrinal
protections, and sometimes only in practice, to control for this First
Amendment risk.
Although the First Amendment is not understood to apply as a
general evidentiary privilege, the Supreme Court has created
prophylactic evidentiary doctrines for specific types of cases that have
163
the potential to punish defendants for protected expression. For
instance, the Court has held that in defamation cases, the First

161. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1326–27 (2003)
(explaining how conspiracy law prevents sophisticated individuals who lead criminal
undertakings from insulating themselves from personal criminal liability).
162. This is unlike, say, a conviction for possession of obscene materials in which the jury
was improperly instructed as to the legal definition of obscenity. In that type of case, the
defendant’s First Amendment rights are violated whether or not the alleged factual basis of the
charge is true. In the fantasy-defense context, a conviction does not punish the defendant’s
protected First Amendment expression when the alleged factual basis of the charge—that the
communication was the actual conspiracy agreement—is true.
163. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (listing some examples and stating
that “we have often held some procedures—a particular allocation of the burden of proof, a
particular quantum of proof, a particular type of appellate review, and so on—to be
constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected speech”); Peter E. Quint,
Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United
States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1648–51 (1977) (listing cases in which the Court has
adopted special evidentiary rules to protect speech); see also Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of
First Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of a Higher Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1994) (evaluating Quint’s discussion).
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Amendment requires a plaintiff who is a public official to bear the
164
burden of proof in showing “actual malice,” and also to prove actual
165
malice by clear and convincing evidence. In another case, the Court
struck down a state constitutional provision that placed the burden of
proof on a taxpayer to show that he had not engaged in “advocacy of
‘the overthrow of Government . . . by unlawful means’” to qualify for
a tax exemption for veterans, on the grounds that the government
may not restrict speech by manipulation of evidentiary presumptions
166
any more than it may by direct regulation.
For speech that doubles as criminal conduct, like conspiracy, the
Supreme Court has not articulated similar heightened evidentiary
standards. However, the Court acknowledged possible First
Amendment problems for crimes like conspiracy in Noto v. United
167
168
States and Scales v. United States —companion cases involving the
Smith Act’s membership clause, which criminalized being an active
member of a group that planned violent overthrow of the government
with the specific intent that the group’s illegal goals be
169
accomplished.
The Court emphasized that the specific-intent
element, “like [the] others, must be judged strictissimi juris” to avoid
impugning the First Amendment freedom of association, “for
otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate
aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to
accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his
170
adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes.”
Although Scales and Noto are most fairly read as a reminder of
the importance of holding the government to its usual burden of
proof, some lower courts have taken them as an invitation to
articulate their own heightened evidentiary standards in prosecutions
171
of speech that doubles as crime. The First Circuit’s widely cited
164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
165. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
166. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520, 528–29 (1958). “The vice of the present procedure
is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the
possibility of mistaken factfinding—inherent in all litigation—will create the danger that the
legitimate utterance will be penalized.” Id. at 526.
167. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
168. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
169. Id. at 205–06.
170. Noto, 367 U.S. at 299–300.
171. See Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1961) (overturning a Smith
Act conviction where the government failed to prove specific intent strictissimi juris, and
holding that specific intent could be proven by “activity . . . which is explainable on no other
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opinion in United States v. Spock contains perhaps the broadest
application of these decisions. Spock was convicted of conspiracy to
aid and abet Selective Service registrants in avoiding service based on
173
his participation in an anti-draft group. Some of the group’s rhetoric
was purely political, but some members of the group also advocated
174
for the burning of draft cards and other illegal resistance. Spock
argued that his part in the group’s activities consisted solely of
political expression, not conspiracy to commit illegal acts, and should
175
therefore gain First Amendment protection. The First Circuit, citing
Scales and Noto, held:
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political within
the shadow of the First Amendment, we hold that an individual’s
specific intent to adhere to the illegal portions may be shown in one
of three ways: by the individual defendant’s prior or subsequent
unambiguous statements; by the individual defendant’s subsequent
commission of the very illegal act contemplated by the agreement;
or by the individual defendant’s subsequent legal act if that act is
“clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective
176
the later illegal activity which is advocated.”

In addition to these special prophylactic doctrines, in practice,
the Supreme Court and lower courts sometimes import First
Amendment concerns into what is purported to be application of
177
178
ordinary evidentiary rules. In Dawson v. Delaware, for instance,
the Supreme Court held that although no per se ban on evidence of
First Amendment−protected activity exists at sentencing, admitting
evidence of a criminal defendant’s ties to the Aryan Brotherhood in
his sentencing for murder violated his First Amendment right to

basis than that [a defendant] personally intended to bring about the overthrow of the
Government as speedily as circumstances would permit”); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,
173 (1st Cir. 1969).
172. Spock, 416 F.2d 165.
173. Id. at 168.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 169 (raising First Amendment issues considering the public nature of some of
the acts of the defendants).
176. Id. at 173 (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)).
177. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1992); see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
180 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion on my understanding that in
heeding these admonitions [about relevance analysis], the district court must ensure that the
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege in a
case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a proper balance.”).
178. Dawson, 503 U.S. 159.
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179

freedom of association. According to the Court, the defendant’s
membership in the organization demonstrated only his “abstract
beliefs,” which, in the Court’s estimation, were irrelevant to
character, even under the relatively lax evidentiary standards of the
180
sentencing phase. Although the Court purported to apply its typical
relevance analysis to reach this result, Justice Thomas in dissent was
skeptical that a defendant’s moral beliefs could ever be “irrelevant”
to character, and suggested that the Court in fact applied a higher
relevance standard, seemingly to protect the defendant from being
punished for the content of his thoughts in violation of the First
181
Amendment.
Like the Supreme Court in Dawson, the lower courts have in
practice adopted heightened evidentiary standards for evidence that
poses a risk of punishing a defendant for First Amendment activity,
182
particularly in Rule 403 analyses. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states that relevant evidence may be excluded when its
probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the risk of “unfair
183
prejudice” to the party against whom the evidence is offered. In one
instance of Rule 403 analysis in the shadow of the First Amendment,
the Fifth Circuit explicitly gave weight to First Amendment concerns
in excluding evidence of a medical society’s meeting, stating,
“Admissibility, we think, should be governed by a test that weighs the
probativeness of and the plaintiff’s need for the evidence against the
danger that admission of the evidence will prejudice the defendant’s
184
[F]irst [A]mendment rights.” On similar grounds, the Seventh
Circuit excluded evidence that banks lobbied together that was

179. Id. Freedom of association is not expressly mentioned in the text of the First
Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that it is protected by the First Amendment right
to expression. Id. at 163–64.
180. Id. at 168. In the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, the standard rules of evidence do
not apply. Furthermore, even at the trial stage, evidence is not inadmissible simply by virtue of
constituting expression within the meaning of the First Amendment. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
181. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 173–76 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas excoriated the
majority for obscuring its true reasoning, finding it implausible that gang membership was
anything but highly relevant in sentencing to help a jury determine the defendant’s character
and dangerousness. Id.
182. See, e.g., Walther v. FEC, 82 F.R.D. 200, 202 (D.D.C. 1979) (recognizing “that
discovery may be restricted when it unnecessarily interferes with [F]irst [A]mendment
activity”).
183. FED. R. EVID. 403.
184. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978).
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185

purported to show that they collaborated in a price-fixing scheme. It
held the evidence inadmissible under Rule 403 because admission
“could easily result in a finding of antitrust liability for engaging in
the First Amendment right to petition which Noerr-Pennington
186
protects.”
As in those cases, fantasy-defense cases implicate the concern
that a defendant will be punished for his First Amendment activity,
rather than the charged crime. This danger is arguably greater for
defendants claiming gruesome fantasies as a defense than it is, for
instance, for defendants engaging in lobbying activity. The
inflammatory nature of the fantasies, combined with the difficulty of
drawing the line between fantasy and conspiracy, makes clear the
serious constitutional issues in fantasy-defense cases.
III. THE ACTUS REUS REQUIREMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW
It is a cherished maxim of criminal law that “evil intent alone”
187
may not be punished. Rather, criminal law’s traditional actus reus
requirement expresses “the feeling that the individual thinking evil
thoughts must be protected from a state which may class him as a
188
threat to its security.” This has not always been the case: for
instance, it was once a crime in England to “compass or imagine, the
189
death of the king.” For the past several centuries, however, action
190
has been firmly established as a prerequisite to punishment.
Ancient maxims aside, there are obvious practical barriers
associated with prosecuting thought: namely, the difficulty of knowing
191
what lies within another person’s mind. Indeed, to demonstrate the
necessity of the actus reus doctrine, criminal-law textbooks have
resorted to imagining dystopian futures in which the government can
185. Weit v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 641 F.2d 457, 467 (7th Cir. 1981).
186. Id. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, private entities are not liable under the
Sherman Act for having attempted to influence the passage of laws “even though the resulting
official action damaged other competitors at whom the campaign was aimed.” United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). However, Pennington notes that
evidence of such activity in proceedings based on other violations of the Sherman Act is subject
to only ordinary evidentiary rules. Id. at 670 n.3.
187. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 405
(1959).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 405 n.1.
190. Id. at 405.
191. See id. (describing the actus reus requirement as “[r]ooted in skepticism about the
ability . . . to know what passes through the minds of men”).
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read brainwaves with cutting-edge technology, or science-fiction
scenarios in which psychics can predict crimes long before their
193
commission.
However, these speculative mind-reading tools are no longer
necessary to give the government a window into a person’s thoughts.
Rather, individuals proclaim their ponderings publicly over Twitter,
Facebook, and other social-media sites, or privately in emails, chats,
194
and online journals. Law enforcement regularly accesses social
195
media as a crime-fighting tool, and we now know that even our most
private and secure online activities are subject to scrutiny by the
196
federal government.
But despite our apparent willingness to share our innermost
thoughts online, popular opinion rebels at the notion of thoughtcrime
197
as representing the epitome of Orwellian overreach. For instance,
some critics have invoked the concept to denounce the recent
institution of hate-crime legislation, arguing that punishment
enhancements based on unacceptable thoughts like racial animus
198
allow criminal law to intrude too far into men’s minds. Like the
rationales underpinning the First Amendment, this understanding of
the actus reus requirement relies on values of personal liberty and the
free exchange of ideas.

192. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 129 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing a study in which psychologists could identify ten
out of twelve mock terrorists by their brainwaves).
193. See id. (discussing the 2002 film Minority Report); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Advances in the psychic and related sciences may
bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?”).
194. See Chris Rose, The Security Implications of Ubiquitous Social Media, 15 INT’L J. OF
MGMT. & INFO. SYS. 35, 36 (2011) (“Society is changing, norms are changing, confidentiality is
being replaced by openness. If you join . . . social media sites, this means giving up some privacy,
but millions of people are willing do so just to be a part of this social media phenomenon.”).
195. See Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as a Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug.
30, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-socialmedia (reporting that 80 percent of law-enforcement officers who use social media use it for
their investigations).
196. See, e.g., James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. and Britain Extended Spying to 1,000
Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. and British governments were
spying on the email traffic, phone calls, and other communications of over one thousand people,
including government officials of other countries).
197. See, e.g., Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn This Article: It Is Evidence in Your Thought Crime
Prosecution, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 461, 461–62, 468–70 (2000) (referencing George Orwell’s
novel 1984 to argue that hate crime is thoughtcrime and thus impermissible).
198. See, e.g., id. at 468–70.
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Of course, some might argue that there is a distinction between
punishing thoughts and punishing expression—just as there is a
distinction between punishing someone for thinking about killing the
king and punishing someone for talking about killing the king. One
could conceive of the latter act as a thoughtcrime or not, depending
on whether the speaker is ultimately punished for her expression’s
thought-content—wishing the king was dead—or for her effort to
actually bring about such a result—such as asking a hitman to kill the
king.
Not only does the actus reus requirement protect against
punishing expression for its thought-content as an end in itself, but it
also protects against wrongly punishing expression because of an
incorrect belief that it will lead to harmful action. In other words, it
ensures that only those who truly threaten society are punished, by
“seek[ing] to assure that the evil intent of the man branded a criminal
has been expressed in a manner signifying harm to society; that there
is no longer any substantial likelihood that he will be deterred by the
threat of sanction; and that there has been an identifiable
199
occurrence.” Concluding that a given expression of fantasy will lead
to action requires two inferential steps: first, the inference that the
expressed fantasy represents actual desire, and second, the inference
that the desire will lead to action. Both inferences are highly
problematic—for example, although multitudes of beleaguered
employees may fantasize about the office burning down, most would
not actually want such an event to pass, and fewer still would take
200
action to bring it to fruition.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that sexual fantasy is no
exception to this principle. First, sexual fantasies do not necessarily
201
represent actual desires. For instance, although many women
fantasize about rape, that fantasy does not reflect a desire to be
202
raped. Similarly, many men and women who fantasize about same203
sex encounters nonetheless identify as heterosexual. Second, though
deviant sexual fantasies are almost universal, they are rarely acted
199. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 405.
200. See OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999) (portraying an employee burning
down his office as a twist ending, even though the employees of the office are generally unhappy
with their jobs).
201. See SIMON LEVAY & JANICE BALDWIN, HUMAN SEXUALITY 235 (4th ed. 2012)
(explaining that rape fantasies do not reflect a desire to be raped).
202. Id. at 234–35.
203. Id. at 233.

EK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CONSPIRACY AND FANTASY

1/26/2015 8:11 PM

929

204

upon. In one study, researchers found that although almost all of
those who participated in deviant sexual behavior had fantasized
about it at some point, the reverse was not true: most of those with
205
deviant sexual fantasies had never acted on them.
The inferential steps are even more attenuated for cannibal
fetishists. Startlingly, fantasizing about cannibalism is prevalent
enough to warrant its own psychological terminology (vorarephilia)
206
and Internet slang (vore). Dark Fetish Net, the website Gilberto
207
Valle used, has hundreds of users who list cannibalism as a fetish,
208
and other vore sites boast membership in the tens of thousands.
However, among these scores of cannibalism enthusiasts, there has
been only one recorded case of a vore-forum user actually committing
cannibalism: a German man who killed and ate his victim at the
209
victim’s own request. Moreover, forum users often state in their
profiles that they are interested only in fantasy, and, outside the
context of role-play, widely affirm their unwillingness to actually eat
210
human beings.
Thus, although modern technology allows the government to
engage in some “mind-reading,” the tenets of criminal law prohibit
204. See Kevin M. Williams, Barry S. Cooper, Teresa M. Howell, John C. Yuille & Delroy
L. Paulhus, Inferring Sexually Deviant Behavior from Corresponding Fantasies: The Role of
Personality and Pornography Consumption, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 198, 205–06 (2008)
(finding that 95 percent of the study subjects had deviant sexual fantasies, but only 38 percent of
those with deviant sexual fantasies had acted on them).
205. Id.
206. Amy D. Lykins & James M. Cantor, Vorarephilia: A Case Study in Masochism and
Erotic Consumption, 43 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 181, 181 (2014).
207. See
Members
List,
DARK FETISH NETWORK,
http://darkfetishnet.com/
search_advanced.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (yielding through search 252 users who list
cannibalism as their “main fetish,” and an additional 112 who list it as another “fetish interest”).
208. See Josh Kurp, Cannibal Seeking Same: A Visit to the Online World of Flesh-Eaters,
THE AWL (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.theawl.com/2011/03/cannibals-seeking-same-a-visit-tothe-online-world-of-flesh-eaters (describing Dolcett Girls Forum, a site dedicated to
cannibalism fetishes with over forty thousand members).
209. See Daniel Politi, German Police Officer Arrested in Alleged Cannibalism Case, SLATE
(Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2013/11/29/german_police_officer_
arrested_in_alleged_cannibalism_case.html (describing a current case in which if suspicions of
fetishistic cannibalism are confirmed, it will be the second time such a crime has been
committed in Germany).
210. On the vore forum Dolcett Girls, one commenter in a thread called “Would you?
Really?” asked: “If presented with an opportunity to Eat a Female in a ‘Dolcett-ish’ fantasy
fulfillment . . . would you?” Kurp, supra note 208. In a response typical of the thread, one user
replied, “In the end, I think I would probably avoid it in real life. Nice to think about, wonderful
to see animated or made into a movie, but I’ve seen enough blood and other really nasty things
in my life (some of them done to me) that I really don’t want to feel the rest of that blade.” Id.
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punishment until it is clear that thoughts will lead to harm. Both
popular notions of personal liberty and the attenuated relationship
between thought and action necessitate this conclusion. The actus
reus requirement is therefore necessary to protect these criminal law
ideals, particularly in fantasy-defense cases.
IV. CONSPIRACY LAW’S THREAT TO THOUGHT AND FANTASY
The heart of criminal conspiracy is agreement to achieve—rather
211
than proximity to achieving—an unlawful goal. Its basis is the
assumption that “to unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength,
opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and
212
more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.” In
other words, as long as he has agreed with another to commit a crime,
a defendant can be arrested for conspiracy well before he has even
213
come close to achieving his purpose.
This feature of conspiracy—“that darling of the modern
214
prosecutor’s nursery,” as Judge Learned Hand called it—has led to
215
its dramatic expansion in recent decades. Conspiracy has two major
functions that make it “an increasingly important weapon in the
216
prosecutor’s armory.” First, conspiracy operates as an inchoate
offense that allows law enforcement to intervene early in criminal
217
activity and prevent its harms. Second, a judicial finding of

211. See Goldstein, supra note 187, at 406 (“[C]onspiracy doctrine comes closest to making a
state of mind the occasion for preventive action against those who threaten society but who
have come nowhere near carrying out the threat. No effort is made to find the point at which
criminal intent is transformed into the beginnings of action dangerous to the community.”). In
fact, under the common-law definition, conspiracy does not even require an unlawful goal, but
can be premised on an agreement to achieve a lawful goal by unlawful means. People v. Carter,
330 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Mich. 1982).
212. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448–49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
213. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (1959)
(“When the defendant has chosen to act in concert with others, rather than to act alone, the
point of justifiable intervention is reached at an earlier stage.”).
214. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
215. See Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time To Turn Back from an Ever
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 8 (1992) (describing a
“substantial increase” in federal conspiracy prosecutions between 1952 and 1992).
216. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 922.
217. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (“[A]t some point in the continuum
between preparation and consummation, the likelihood of a commission of an act is sufficiently
great and the criminal intent sufficiently well formed to justify the intervention of the criminal
law.”).
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219

conspiracy triggers procedural and evidentiary advantages that
allow defendants to be implicated in criminal activity for which they
220
might otherwise escape liability.
However, critics allege that these functions, while useful, are
vulnerable to abuse and carry a “serious threat to fairness in our
221
administration of justice.” Conspiracy law endangers both the First
Amendment right to thought and fantasy, as well as the ideal—
manifested in criminal law’s actus reus requirement—that only
expression and conduct posing an actual risk of harm may be
222
punished. The threat originates from two unique and interrelated
features of conspiracy law. First, because conspiracy seeks to punish
agreement itself rather than an independent act, more than any other
crime, conspiracy “comes closest to making a state of mind the
223
occasion for preventive action.”
Second, prosecutors have
unparalleled flexibility in proving conspiracy, heightening the risk
that a defendant will be convicted for what he thinks rather than for
224
what he does.
A. Conspiracy and the Actus Reus
Ironically, given these criticisms, conspiracy is often described as
225
requiring not just one, but two acts. First, the defendant must
226
intentionally agree with another to achieve an unlawful purpose.
Second, the defendant must take some overt action in furtherance of

218. Most notably, the Pinkerton doctrine under federal law allows one conspirator to be
held liable for all acts of the other conspirators that were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy
and were reasonably foreseeable. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
Additionally, a finding of conspiracy allows all of the alleged conspirators to be charged in any
jurisdiction where any overt act took place. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 365–67 (1912).
219. Namely, a judicial finding of conspiracy exempts co-conspirator statements from the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
220. See Katyal, supra note 161, at 1326–27 (“In general, those insulated will be leaders, who
orchestrate actions to maintain plausible deniability. . . . Conspiracy liability partially
compensates for diffusion by punishing those who hide behind the veneer of the group.”).
221. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
222. See supra Parts II−III.
223. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 406.
224. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 920.
225. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (holding that a particular statute
did not require proof of an overt act, even though it is typically an element of many conspiracy
statutes).
226. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
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the agreement. Conspiracy has a double mens rea as well: in
addition to the state of mind required for each actus reus, the
defendant must have the specific intent that the object of the
228
conspiracy be effected.
Criminal agreement is thought to be the primary danger of
229
conspiracy, and the true actus reus of the offense. Agreement in
conspiracy may be proven by either direct or circumstantial
230
evidence. In a typical conspiracy case, law enforcement finds no
231
written memorialization or other direct evidence of agreement.
Instead, agreement often must be inferred from the actions of the
232
defendants. Judges routinely prepare jury instructions to the effect
that “conspirators do not go out upon the public highways and
proclaim their purpose; their methods are devious, hidden, secret and
233
clandestine.”
Overt acts require still less in the way of proof. Unlike
agreement, the overt-act requirement is a vaguely defined concept
234
that does not quite rise to the level of an actus reus. In fact, some
235
federal conspiracy statutes do not even require an overt act at all.
The Supreme Court has upheld these statutes on the grounds that
neither the common-law backdrop to conspiracy law nor the ordinary
principles of statutory construction require reading an overt-act

227. The overt-act requirement varies—some federal statutes do not require proof of an
overt act as an element of conspiracy, but many do. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209,
214 (2005) (explaining that some, but not all, federal statutes have an overt-act requirement).
228. See United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (“To establish a
defendant’s willing participation, the government must show ‘two kinds of intent: intent to agree
and intent to commit the substantive offense.’” (quoting United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570
F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009))).
229. See Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 777 (“Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is
an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”).
230. See United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (“While the government
must establish the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, this can be done entirely
through circumstantial evidence.”).
231. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 933
(“Conspiracy is by nature a clandestine offense. It is improbable that the parties will enter into
their illegal agreement openly.”).
232. Id.
233. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 411 n.15 (citation omitted).
234. Indeed, some have argued that the overt-act requirement cannot be properly described
as an element at all, but as a mere procedural requirement. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S.
347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The cases in this court have agreed that the statute has
not made the overt act a part of the crime, which still remains the conspiracy alone.”).
235. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214 (2005) (explaining that some, but not
all, federal statutes have an overt-act requirement).
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requirement into a statute that does not explicitly contain one.
Rather, the Court said in Shabani that agreement alone is sufficient
237
actus reus to pass constitutional muster.
The origins and rationale of the overt-act requirement are
238
somewhat murky. It may have originated as a kind of descriptive
formalization of the “legislative interpretation of what was necessary
to prove a conspiracy at common law,” since agreement is usually
239
proven by circumstantial evidence. Others posit that the overt-act
240
requirement serves merely as a formal procedural requirement.
Most popular and convincing, however, is the argument that the overt
act serves to “manifest that the conspiracy is at work,” and is not just
241
“a project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators.” In
this view, the overt act serves to buttress the actus reus’s role in
ensuring that bad thought is punished only when it poses an actual
threat to society. Or, to reframe the analysis slightly, the overt act
helps safeguard “mere talk” from being wrongly understood to signify
242
specific intent to achieve an unlawful goal.
Under current law, almost any act, no matter how small, may
243
fulfill the overt-act requirement. It may be minor to the point of
244
triviality, and need not even be “reasonably calculated to effect the

236. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) (declining to read an overt-act
requirement into a statute that did not explicitly state one).
237. Id. at 15–16.
238. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 946 (“The
inclusion of the overt-act requirement in the federal general conspiracy statute was
unaccompanied by any indication of the function it was to serve.”).
239. Id. at 946–47.
240. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no
more a part of the crime . . . than is the fact that the statute of limitations has not run.”).
Additionally, in some jurisdictions the overt act serves to establish venue. See United States v.
Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In a prosecution for conspiracy, venue is proper in
any district in which ‘an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the
coconspirators.’” (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 826 (2d Cir. 1987))).
241. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (quoting Carlson v. United States, 187
F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1951) (quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
242. See United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 169 (E.D.N.Y 1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 75
(2d Cir. 1999) (“As an added protection to defendants against punishment for mere talk, in
some instances an overt act must take place in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).
243. See, e.g., Yates, 354 U.S. at 334 (holding that attending an otherwise lawful meeting
constituted an overt act).
244. See id.
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specific object of the conspiracy.” That an act was undertaken in
furtherance of a conspiracy may be inferred from the existence of the
246
agreement. Thus, even an innocent and lawful act, when infected
with criminal agreement, can serve as the overt act that may create
247
criminal liability—even calling someone on the telephone or driving
248
to another city can be enough. The overt act need not even be the
defendant’s, but can be carried out by any of the alleged conspirators,
249
including those not named in the indictment.
Giving the prosecutor such wide latitude to prove conspiracy
weakens the actus reus requirement; when agreement can be proven
by circumstantial evidence, and an overt act can be almost any
minimally corroborative, innocuous event, the “double” actus reus
requirement starts to look more like a half measure. As Professor
Steven Morrison rather sarcastically explains it, “[W]e know that
defendants agreed to rob a bank because they bought ski masks.
Buying ski masks constitutes an overt act because the defendants
250
agreed to rob the bank.” This kind of bootstrapping effectively
lowers the standard of proof for the agreement to something less than
beyond a reasonable doubt, and allows the jury to convict on only the
251
barest implication that a crime has occurred.
The weak actus reus requirement of conspiracy law has given rise
to a series of cases in which juries have convicted defendants on the
245. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (describing
a court’s decision that a statutory offense for conspiracy only required an agreement, and that
“the overt act merely afford[ed] a ‘locus poenitentiae’ so that before the commission of the act a
conspirator might withdraw from the scheme without incurring guilt”).
246. See United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (“While the government
must establish the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, this can be done entirely
through circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir.
2005) (“[T]he very nature of the crime of conspiracy is such that it often may be established only
by indirect and circumstantial evidence.”).
247. See Bartoli v. United States, 192 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1951) (“In our opinion, the
telephone conversations . . . were all overt acts.”).
248. See United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1550–51 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
transportation of smuggled electronics through the Middle District of Florida was a sufficient
overt act performed in furtherance of a conspiracy to create venue in the district).
249. United States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1997).
250. Morrison, supra note 141, at 896–97.
251. Goldstein, supra note 187, at 411–12 (“The net effect . . . is to free juries from the
automatic compliance with ‘law’ which instructions ordinar[i]ly demand and to invite a ‘guilty’
verdict on less evidence than might otherwise be required.”); Developments in the Law—
Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (arguing that “in their zeal to emphasize that the
agreement need not be proved directly, the courts sometimes neglect to say that it need be
proved at all”).
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basis of evidence so insufficient as to breach the constitutional
252
requirement that crimes be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
most notorious of these cases involve large, multi-defendant
conspiracy trials. In these group-liability cases, defendants who have
some association with conspirators, but who are not themselves part
of any conspiracy, are likely to be “swept into the conspiratorial
253
net.” Because “[t]here generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by
254
somebody,” and because the jury is expressly permitted to make
inferences from circumstantial evidence, even a defendant who did no
more than ride in a conspirator’s car can be convicted for a criminal
255
plot he never intended to join. Conspiracy’s weak actus reus
requirement often poses a temptation too great to resist for the
average jury to find a defendant guilty by his association with
256
conspirators.
B. The Fantasy Defense
Conspiracy law poses two main problems for those claiming a
fantasy defense. First, conspiracy’s de facto relaxed standard of proof
poses the risk of convicting defendants on the basis of insufficient
evidence, a due-process violation. Second, because the charged
agreement involved in a fantasy-defense case is likely to be highly
inflammatory, the jury may convict a defendant on the basis of the

252. See Marcus, supra note 215, at 19 n.98 (“[I]t is not clear whether the courts mean to
suggest that jurors can be instructed on anything other than the reasonable doubt standard for
individual defendants (clearly they cannot be) or whether somehow the government is relieved
of its burden to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Professor Paul Marcus conducted an
empirical study of conspiracy law in 1977 by interviewing over one hundred judges and lawyers
and distributing questionnaires to many others. Id. at 2. In 1992, he followed up with written
communications to those judges and lawyers to see how conspiracy prosecutions had changed.
Id. He found that the survey respondents observed growing sensitivity to issues of insufficient
proof in conspiracy prosecutions, and one lawyer noted that “[these] courts have reversed
several conspiracy convictions . . . where, though the evidence may have aroused substantial
suspicion concerning the defendant, it failed to establish more than association and presence.”
Id. at 19–20 (alteration in original).
253. Id. at 18–19.
254. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
255. See United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 519 (11th Cir. 1990) (overturning the
defendant’s conviction in a drug conspiracy because the only evidence linking him to the
conspiracy was a ride he took in a conspirator’s car and his presence at a drug transaction, which
was insufficient proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
256. See Marcus, supra note 215, at 19–20 (discussing instances of courts reversing
conspiracy convictions where the evidence established only that individual defendants were
associated with the conspirators).
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thought-content of her expression, whether or not it believes she truly
intended to achieve an unlawful goal. This second problem is both a
due-process violation—because of its probability of leading to
wrongful convictions based on fantasy instead of real conspiracy—
and a First Amendment violation—because a wrongful conviction
also infringes the defendant’s right to expression.
The fantasy defense is too new a development to have
engendered substantial scholarship or appellate opinions the way
large, multi-defendant conspiracy cases have, making it difficult to
257
evaluate the impact of conspiracy law on fantasy defendants.
However, by comparing the characteristics of the large group-liability
cases that lead to wrongful convictions to characteristics of fantasydefense cases, it becomes clear that the fantasy-defense cases pose an
even greater risk of wrongful convictions.
First, as in the group-liability context, conspiracy cases involving
the fantasy defense pose a due-process risk of convicting an innocent
defendant on insufficient evidence as a result of the weak actus reus
requirement. Arguably, the fantasy defense poses a greater risk of
conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence. In group-liability
cases, the risk of convicting an innocent defendant stems from the
possibility of the jury giving too much weight to circumstantial
258
evidence of an agreement. For example, a jury might impermissibly
conclude that a defendant has agreed to take part in a conspiracy
259
because he was near the crime scene and knew the conspirators. In
fantasy-defense cases, in contrast, the jury is presented with what the
prosecution claims is direct evidence of agreement. In Valle’s case, for
instance, the government’s case relied on the proposition that Valle’s
260
chats represented actual agreement, rather than fantasy expression.
Thus, the due-process risk in these cases is the possibility that a jury
will misinterpret expressions of fantasy as expressions of
conspiratorial agreement on the basis of constitutionally insufficient
evidence. Arguably, this problem is more subtle and difficult to

257. One exception is a paper discussing the fantasy defense in the context of the Patrick J.
Naughton case. See Yamagami, supra note 77, at 547. The Naughton case is discussed in Part
II.D.
258. See Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 213, at 947 (discussing
strategies used by prosecutors to circumvent the overt-act requirement in conspiracy cases).
259. See, e.g., Hernandez, 896 F.2d at 519 (where the only evidence linking the defendant to
the conspiracy was the fact that he rode in a conspirator’s car and was present at a drug
transaction).
260. See supra Part I.
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understand than the problem posed in the group-liability context. As
a result, it seems even more likely that a jury will convict a defendant
in a fantasy-defense case on the basis of insufficient evidence of an
unlawful agreement.
Second, fantasy-defense cases pose an additional risk that groupliability cases do not. Although defendants in both categories suffer
the risk of a conviction based on insufficient evidence—albeit in
slightly different ways—the fantasy-defense cases additionally raise
the concern that a defendant will be convicted for the thought261
content of his expression, rather than for his conduct. As discussed
previously, the actus reus requirement functions as criminal law’s
primary protection against both the risk that a defendant will be
punished for the bad thought-content of his expression, as well as the
risk that a jury will punish a defendant’s thoughts in the mistaken
262
belief that they will necessarily lead to action. Because fantasydefense cases, like Valle’s, are likely to demonstrate that the
defendant has expressed inflammatory and taboo thoughts, a jury
may convict on the basis of disgust or fear rather than on its actual
belief that a defendant intended his expression as conspiracy
agreement. If conspiracy law’s weak actus reus requirement fails to
protect against even the comparatively simple problem posed by
group-liability cases, it hardly seems plausible that it can protect
against the complex and inflammatory issues that arise in fantasydefense cases.
Therefore, like the defendant convicted because of his trivial
263
association with a conspirator,
the defendant charged with
conspiracy on the basis of his fantasy role-play is likely to be
convicted on the basis of evidence insufficient to prove his unlawful
agreement. However, the fantasy role-player runs an even greater
risk of unfair conviction than the group-liability defendant because
the jury may punish him for his bad expression, a constitutionally
unacceptable result.
V. LINE-DRAWING AND THE FANTASY DEFENSE
Although the Constitution and core tenets of criminal law
instruct that Gilberto Valle has a right not to be punished for his

261. See supra Part II.
262. See supra Part III.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 253–56.
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fantasy expression, the relaxed actus reus requirement of conspiracy
law, combined with the inflammatory nature of his speech, posed the
265
risk that the jury would do just that. This tension suggests that
additional safeguards are necessary to ensure that those charged with
conspiracy are not unfairly convicted on the basis of the socially
unacceptable thought-content of their expression. First, this Part uses
Valle’s case to demonstrate why conspiracy law must be reformed to
protect those who invoke a fantasy defense from due-process and
First Amendment violations. Second, this Part explores some possible
safeguards, and proposes that the best option is overruling Shabani
and strengthening the overt-act requirement.
A. Valle’s Acquittal: A Case Study in the Need for Safeguards in
Conspiracy Cases
Gilberto Valle’s trial starkly demonstrated both the due-process
and First Amendment risks a conspiracy prosecution poses to those
who claim a fantasy defense. First, the prosecution offered
insufficient evidence that Valle had actually entered into an
agreement to commit an unlawful act. Second, the inflammatory
nature of Valle’s expression rendered it likely that the jury would be
disgusted by or afraid of him, and would therefore be more willing to
convict.
To begin with, the prosecution introduced direct evidence of
agreement in the form of Valle’s chats, but offered little in the way of
extrinsic evidence from which the jurors could infer the meaning
behind the text—that is, whether the chats were fantasy or
266
agreement. Rather, Valle’s alleged overt acts—including visiting
one woman for brunch with his wife and child in tow, giving PBA
cards to various acquaintances, and texting friends—were just as
likely to be innocuous social gestures as they were to bear any actual
267
relation to a kidnapping conspiracy. In other words, the purported
overt acts, while meeting the current legal standard to fulfill that
requirement, did not perform their function of bolstering the actus
reus requirement to ensure that Valle’s expression actually signified
his intent to kidnap anyone.

264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra Parts II−III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra text accompanying notes 53–58.
See id.
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Furthermore, the emotional incentive for the jury to convict was
great. They were presented with the possibility of a truly horrific
criminal plot, and tasked with determining whether it was real or
fantasy without much substantial evidence to indicate which to
268
choose. They were invited to make this determination on the basis
of any and all of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution offered,
including not only the content of the chats alleged to represent
agreement, but also the contents of chats that concededly represented
269
fantasies. Furthermore, they were to make this determination using
their own “common sense,” without the benefit of any expert
270
testimony explaining the relationship between fantasy and action. A
reasonable person could very well become convinced that a man like
Gilberto Valle, guilty of the charged crime or not, was too dangerous
or too distasteful to live among the population at large.
Of course the government could (and in Valle’s case did) argue
that it is the special province of the jury to sift through the evidence,
contested though it may be, and determine a defendant’s true
271
intentions. After all, the courts have said that giving deference to a
jury’s verdict is “especially important when reviewing a conviction for
conspiracy” because of the jury’s role in applying their understanding
of human behavior to draw inferences about whether a conspiracy
272
273
exists. The jury has never been treated as infallible, however. In
fact, our entire body of evidentiary rules exists to mitigate the risk
that a jury will convict or acquit a defendant based on the wrong kind
274
of information or reasoning. Courts have proven especially willing
to control jury decisionmaking when First Amendment rights are at
275
stake. And although examples are rare, courts will sometimes
276
overturn a jury verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence.

268. See id.
269. See supra text accompanying note 61.
270. See Transcript of Record at 1582, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013) (referring to the “limits of fantasy under common sense”).
271. Response of the United States of America in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motions
for a New Trial and Judgment of Acquittal at 6, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Thus, the task of choosing among the permissible competing
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence is for the jury, not for the reviewing court.”).
272. See United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120–21 (2d Cir. 1992).
273. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 215, at 13 (discussing the actions of trial judges to break up
large conspiracy cases to make the jury’s task of determining individual guilt easier).
274. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (2d ed. 2008).
275. See supra Part II.C.
276. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
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Of course, Judge Gardephe did just that, holding that the jury
277
convicted Valle on the basis of insufficient evidence. For a judge to
overturn a jury verdict, it must be the case that even when all the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, no
278
reasonable jury could convict the defendant. The risk inherent in
having a jury decide fantasy-defense cases under current conspiracy
law should be evident to any observer; it seems highly plausible that
the jury convicted Valle based not on his actions, but on his fantasies,
either because his fantasies were horrific, or because—due to
conspiracy law’s de facto relaxed burden of proof—the jury
misinterpreted his expression of fantasy as an actual agreement to
kidnap and eat other human beings. The fact that Judge Gardephe
resorted to the rare remedy of overturning a jury verdict further
demonstrates the singular risk of unconstitutional convictions in
fantasy-defense cases.
If it can be shown that a jury is likely to convict a defendant on
anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, some safeguard
is not only justified, but required to prevent a violation of a
279
defendant’s constitutional rights.
Establishing reasonable
safeguards is particularly important because though Valle’s case is
truly bizarre, the fantasy defense seems unlikely to stop with him. As
law enforcement becomes increasingly Internet-savvy, we are likely to
continue to see defendants like Valle arrested for their chats and
280
forum participation.
Of course, for every defendant like Valle, who can make a strong
case that his chats were mere expressions of fantasy, there is another
281
Internet user who really does pose a threat to society. For example,
a Boston-area man recently pled guilty to solicitation to commit a
crime of violence after he described online his plan to kidnap and kill
282
children. These chats led police to discover that he possessed a
soundproofed basement, torture devices, bleach, and a child-size

277. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
278. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
279. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a criminal defendant).
280. See Kelly, supra note 195 (discussing law enforcement’s increasing use of social media
as a crime-fighting tool).
281. Morgan Winsor, Man Who Plotted To Kill and Eat Children Gets More than 26 Years in
Prison, CNN (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/17/us/cannibal-eatchildren-case/index.html.
282. Id.
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coffin, along with other supplies he had acquired in preparation for
283
his plans. Accordingly, this Note does not propose that law
enforcement should refrain from investigating those who engage in
suspicious online conversations. Rather, what the law needs is a more
robust way of distinguishing between the fantasy role-players and the
real criminal conspirators.
B. Potential Modes of Safeguarding the Right to Fantasy
But even if the fantasy defense presents special due-process and
First Amendment problems, what safeguards are appropriate to
ensure that fantasy defendants are not wrongfully convicted on the
basis of their “bad” expression? Although the fantasy defense is too
novel for scholars to have addressed it directly at length, examining
First Amendment protections proposed or enacted in other contexts
may shed light on the question. This Part appraises some of those
protections, before suggesting that the best alternative is for the
Court to overrule Shabani and strengthen the overt-act requirement.
1. Proposed Options.
Two broad categories of doctrinal
safeguards seem possible in the context of the fantasy defense:
changing substantive First Amendment law and changing the
evidentiary requirements of conspiracy law. Though the first method
is perhaps the more traditional approach courts and scholars have
taken with respect to protecting freedom of expression, the latter
method is likely to be more effective in the context of speech that
doubles as criminal conduct.
Often when the free exchange of ideas and personal autonomy
are threatened by a restriction on speech, courts respond by
expanding the definition of First Amendment expression to cover the
area of threatened speech. For example, when the Supreme Court
decided Miller, it limited the scope of the obscenity exception by
redefining obscenity to exclude all but those works that “appeal to
the prurient interest in sex” and have no “serious literary, artistic,
284
political, or scientific value.”
However, this kind of definitional change to the scope of First
Amendment protections seems unlikely to be workable in the area of
conspiracy law, because First Amendment implications for speech as
crime are different in kind from First Amendment implications for
283. Id.
284. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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other kinds of expression like obscenity. An obscenity conviction
based on materials that are protected by the First Amendment
violates the defendant’s rights whether he in fact possesses the
charged material or not. In other words, all that matters to him is the
legal definition of obscenity. However, for speech that doubles as
crime, the conviction violates the defendant’s First Amendment rights
only when the defendant is innocent of the charge. The determining
factor is not the legal, but the factual status of the purported
agreement. No plausible way of changing the legal definition of
“agreement” would be able to capture real, but not fake, criminal
agreements.
This problem with changing the scope of First Amendment
protections by redefining the limits of protected speech suggests that
the appropriate First Amendment prophylactic rule in conspiracy
cases is an evidentiary one. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have already demonstrated some willingness to use evidentiary rules
to protect against the possibility of a defendant being wrongly
convicted for the thought-content of his expression. For example,
recall the First Circuit’s decision in Spock, in which the court outlined
special requirements for proving specific intent in cases where the
purported conspiratorial expression consisted of both protected
speech and potential agreements to participate in a criminal
285
conspiracy. Furthermore, an evidentiary safeguard could protect not
only against the First Amendment risk of a defendant being convicted
for the thought-content of his expression, but also against the dueprocess risk of a defendant being convicted on the basis of insufficient
evidence.
2. The Overt-Act Requirement. Perhaps the most obvious
evidentiary method of safeguarding the right to fantasy is
strengthening conspiracy law’s overt-act requirement. In fact, the
most plausible justification for maintaining an overt-act requirement
at all is to ensure that the conspiracy is indeed “at work,” and that the
286
alleged conspirators actually intended to achieve an unlawful goal.
Despite this function, courts have given short shrift to the overtact requirement over the years. Although many federal conspiracy
statutes require an overt act, the Supreme Court held in Shabani that
an overt-act element is not constitutionally required in a conspiracy
285. See supra text accompanying notes 172–76.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 241–42.
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statute because the agreement itself is the true actus reus of
287
conspiracy offenses.
However, as one commentator points out, the Shabani Court
erred in considering the necessity of the overt act only as a formal
288
actus reus requirement. The Court neglected to factor in another
constitutionally relevant function of the overt act: ensuring that
289
agreement be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The article cites
this as the reason the Court should overrule Shabani, arguing that
without an overt act, no conspiracy can be proven beyond a
290
reasonable doubt. Professor Martin Redish further argues that the
overt act is required to safeguard First Amendment rights in
291
conspiracy prosecutions. He contends that the First Amendment
requires a non-expressive overt act that “effectively transform[s] the
communication into nothing more than an element of the non292
expressive behavior.”
However, as previously discussed, even when an overt-act
requirement is instituted, current conspiracy law treats it more like a
293
formality than a true element, robbing it of its usefulness. An overt
act can be any trivial or innocent act that is minimally consistent in
294
some way with the alleged conspiracy. For example, in Gilberto
Valle’s case, the alleged overt acts included giving out PBA cards,
searching for “targets” in the police database, and arranging social
295
meetings with women. These acts, by the letter of the law, are
sufficient to meet the overt-act requirement. However, it seems
obvious that these acts have little, if any, probative value when it
comes to determining Valle’s true intentions. As the defense pointed

287. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15–16 (1994).
288. See Kevin Jon Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Of Drug Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111, 113
(1996) (equating the overt-act requirement in conspiracy with the Fifth Amendment
reasonable-doubt standard).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 142.
291. Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76
ALB. L. REV. 697, 732 (2013).
292. Id.
293. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no
more a part of the crime . . . than is the fact that the statute of limitations has not run.”).
294. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 6 (1945) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 259
F. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)).
295. Transcript of Record at 1528–30, United States v. Valle, No. 12-cr-00847 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013).
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out, and as the court noted in overturning Valle’s conviction, those
acts are just as consistent with a theory of innocence as they are with
a theory of guilt.
As a result, this Note goes further than those commentators, and
argues that not only is an overt act required to avoid constitutional
violations, but also the overt act must be more substantial than the
kind the law currently considers acceptable. As Professor George
Fletcher points out, this would be a “sensible restrictive measure”
that would prevent the government from using conspiracy to target
296
unpopular speech and thought. However, little, if any, scholarship
or case law seems to have explicitly proposed this solution.
A redefinition of the overt-act requirement could be formulated
a number of ways to balance the constitutional need for the overt act
to be more significant with the government’s interest in effective
prosecution and enforcement. Any redefinition should, however,
include the requirement that an overt act must independently make it
more likely that the defendant actually intended an unlawful goal; an
overt act should not be equally consistent with guilt or innocence.
In designing this definition, one could follow the lead of the First
Circuit in Spock, which suggested that when a defendant participates
in a group that engages in both protected political expression and
illegal conspiratorial agreement, specific intent must be proven in one
of several particular ways. One way the court allowed the government
to prove specific intent was by an “individual defendant’s subsequent
legal act if that act is ‘clearly undertaken for the specific purpose of
297
rendering effective the later illegal activity which is advocated.’”
Another possibility is found in the commentary to a proposed
revision to the federal criminal code, which states, “[T]he overt act
must be such that it manifests a purpose to effect an objective of the
298
agreement.”
These modest definitional changes assign the overt-act
requirement some weight to carry, but pose little risk of preventing
the government from prosecuting a legitimate conspiracy. In Gilberto
Valle’s case, a more robust overt-act requirement could have
precluded the jury’s constitutionally insufficient guilty verdict. As the
court noted in overturning the verdict, “[I]n determining whether the
296. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 225 (2000).
297. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969) (quoting Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)).
298. S. REP. 95-605, at 163 (1977).
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Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt Valle’s criminal
intent—his specific intent to actually kidnap a woman—the fact that
no kidnappings took place and that no real-world, concrete steps
299
toward committing a kidnapping were ever taken, is significant.”
Consequently, if the jury understood conspiracy to require a more
robust overt act like the formulations proposed above, it seems
unlikely that it would have wrongfully convicted Valle.
CONCLUSION
Even a defendant with the most utterly repulsive fantasies
imaginable should not be convicted based on anything less than the
jury’s belief beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the acts
charged. The First Amendment and criminal law’s actus reus
requirement demand that conspiracy law give effect to this standard
to avoid impinging on a defendant’s constitutional right to express his
fantasies and thoughts. Although the current Supreme Court seems
indisposed to tighten the requirements to prove conspiracy, one way
to attain this goal is for courts to return to a meaningful definition of
conspiracy’s overt-act requirement. Bolstering the overt-act
requirement will ensure that juries are better equipped to come to the
correct verdict in cases like Gilberto Valle’s, eliminating the need for
judges to engage in post hoc mitigation.

299. United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (emphasis added).

